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A transformation in governance has swept across Western Europe. During
the past half-century, states, executives, and parliaments have empowered
an increasing number of non-majoritarian institutions (NMIs)1 to make
public policy. In the fields of utility regulation, telecommunications,
antitrust, and media pluralism, and even in the provision of health and
welfare benefits, myriad independent regulatory bodies have been created
and become the loci for making new rules, or applying existing ones to new
situations, at the national level. At the supranational level, central bankers,
insulated from direct political control, set monetary policy. In Brussels,
European Commission officials propose legislation and enforce ever wider
European Union regulation. In Luxembourg, the Court of Justice controls
member state compliance with European law, reviewing the lawfulness of
activities of national parliaments, governments, and administrators. 
The ongoing exercise of authority by non-majoritarian bodies is today
central to governance in a growing number of policy domains. This special
issue seeks to address the sources, consequences, and dynamics of
delegation to NMIs in Western Europe. Here we introduce the core themes
and issues raised by the project, while each subsequent article explores the
politics of delegation more specifically in different polities, sectors, and
institutional settings. We begin by discussing how the group has collectively
chosen to define and conceptualise our topic; we then present theoretical
materials used by political scientists to explain delegation to non-
majoritarian institutions. These ideas developed in the United States during
the 1980s, primarily in research on the relationship between Congress and
American regulatory agencies (see Pollack, this volume).2 We also briefly
discuss relevant ideas found in ‘new-institutional’ organisational sociology.3
Following from the seminal work of Giandomenico Majone4 and Mark
Pollack,5 a literature that uses or otherwise engages American delegation
theory to conceptualise or explain aspects of supranational politics in the
EU has emerged, and is becoming a standard reference point.6 Nonetheless,
comparative research on the sources and consequences of institutional
innovation through delegation to NMIs has been, until recently, scarce.7
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Thereafter, we examine the politics of delegation to NMIs in Europe  the
decision to delegate, the institutional design of delegation and the
consequences of delegation- in light of the project’s findings. 
CONCEPTS AND THEORY 
The title of this volume, The Politics of Delegation: Non-Majoritarian
Institutions in Europe, would seem to be relatively self-explanatory, yet
commonplace words do not always mean the same things to different
people. Our project is concerned with politics, by which we mean public
governance. Although explicit acts of delegation can constitute private
systems of governance (for example, those of the modern corporation), and
although private domains are full of politics, we have chosen to limit our
focus to delegation through public authority. We nonetheless conceive of
governance in a broad, generic way. By governance, we mean the processes
through which the rule systems in place in any human community are
adapted, on an ongoing basis, to the needs and purposes of those who live
under them.8 When governments draft legislative bills, and when legislators
debate, amend, and adopt statutes, they act to (re)construct legal regimes,
and thereby to govern. When administrative officials, operating under a
grant of statutory authority, interpret in order to apply the law in concrete
situations, they too govern. Of course, in a very important sense, all public
governance operates by way of delegation in Europe. The standard model
of parliamentary democracy, for example, has it that (a) the (sovereign)
people bestow authority on legislators by elections, (b) ministers derive
their collective powers from parliament, and (c) the extent of an
administrator’s discretion is determined by statute, as controlled by courts.
In liberal democratic theory, explicit acts of delegation legitimise the
exercise of public authority.
We have chosen to narrow our focus further, to non-majoritarian
institutions, which we define as those governmental entities that (a) possess
and exercise some grant of specialised public authority, separate from that
of other institutions, but (b) are neither directly elected by the people, nor
directly managed by elected officials. We exclude from consideration state
powers organised within the bureaucracy, when the exercise of such powers
are placed under the direct control of ministers and the civil service. We do
not exclude a specialised organ or agency that may be linked to a ministry
in certain formal ways, so long as that body is not merely a department or
administrative office of a larger bureaucratic entity. As this volume shows,
such institutions take a wide diversity of structural forms in Europe,
including independent regulatory agencies, specialised courts, standard-
setting boards, central banks, the European Commission, and so on.
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Given our substantive concerns, we define delegation as an authoritative
decision, formalised as a matter of public law, that (a) transfers policy
making authority away from established, representative organs (those that
are directly elected, or are managed directly by elected politicians), to (b) a
non-majoritarian institution, whether public or private.
The Principal–Agent Approach
The ‘Principal–Agent’ (P–A) framework, developed in American political
science from materials found in organisational and ‘transaction cost’
economics,9 dominates research on the topic of delegation to non-
majoritarian institutions. (Although different terms are sometimes used in the
various strains of this research, we ignore these distinctions here, focusing on
the main elements of P–A approaches; moreover, because Mark Pollack’s
contribution to this volume, among other things, surveys the development of
the P–A approach in research on American politics, we discuss only the
basics here.) In some respects, this dominance is hardly surprising, since the
framework was explicitly developed to account for delegation. The
framework has proved popular, not least because it offers the analyst ready-
made, appropriate concepts, and focuses attention on some of the important
empirical questions about which most political scientists interested in the
topic are likely to be concerned. That said, the P–A framework as it presently
exists is just that – a framework. As causal theory – that is, as an integrated
body of concepts, operationalisable variables, and testable propositions – it
remains incomplete. Indeed, as two proponents of the approach have recently
noted, ‘scholars are only beginning to scratch the surface of what needs to be
done to establish the theoretical validity of the transaction cost approach’.10
Further, hypotheses generated from interpretive case studies and formal
models of delegation have not always found support in subsequent research
designed to test them.11
It is our view that the P–A construct, a general, relatively flexible, and
established approach to thinking about delegation, could not be ignored in
research on NMIs in Europe. The directors of this project did not impose
(for example, by requiring the adoption of) P–A analysis on contributors.
Instead, we asked those critical of the approach to indicate to our readers the
source of their objections. Further, some contributors sought explicitly to
supplement, or replace, P–A ideas with concepts found in other
approaches.12 In all cases, we agreed that important empirical aspects of the
politics delegation should be prioritised, not just theory.
Functional Logics of Delegation
For our purposes, principals are those political officials who use their
authority to establish non-majoritarian institutions through a public act of
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delegation. Agents are those who govern by exercising delegated powers.
By assumption, principals are initially in control, in the strict sense that the
precise terms of the agent’s remit are a matter of institutional design, and the
authority to constitute or not to constitute agents falls within the principals’
jurisdiction. Because principals are willing to pay the costs of delegation
(for example, time and deployment of resources to establish the new
institution and to monitor its activities), they must have found it in their
interest to do so. Indeed, it must be that the expected benefits of delegation
outweigh the costs. Put simply, delegation is functional for principals.
One can be more specific. The more common rationales for delegation
from legislators to agencies, and from nation states to international
organisations, are well known. Principals constitute agents to help them:
• resolve commitment problems (agents are expected to work to enhance
the credibility of promises made, either between multiple principals, or
vis-à-vis principals and their constituents, given underlying collective
action problems);
• overcome information asymmetries in technical areas of governance
(agents are expected to develop and employ expertise in order to
produce, or help principals produce appropriate public policy);
• enhance the efficiency of rule making (agents are expected to respond to
relatively specific problems and issues that arise, while principals set
and then update the more general terms of policy);
• avoid taking blame for unpopular policies (agents are expected to
maximise policy goals that principals know may sometimes be
unpopular with important societal groups).
Of course, for any specific act of delegation, these and other rationales may
overlap, or be one and the same.
Principals can realise the benefits of delegation only by granting
discretion to the agent, that is, through sharing some of their authority to
govern. We will define discretion more carefully shortly. For now, let us
agree that principals know that agents are likely to develop their own
interests – including an interest in producing the best policies, given their
own understanding of the nature of the policy problem and the environment
– and that these interests may conflict with those of the principals.
Simplifying, the extent to which an agent actually does generate outcomes
that are ‘different from the policies preferred by those who [have] delegated
power’,13 is registered as an ‘agency loss’. Principals can reduce agency
losses in advance by conferring restrictive powers on the agent, or on an
ongoing basis by monitoring and reining in the agent. Institutional design is
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an exercise in choosing from a menu of both ex ante and ex post (that is,
ongoing) controls.14 Yet, because the benefits of delegation decline the more
the principal limits the agent’s discretion, the trick is to delegate just the
amount of power to enable agents to achieve desired outcomes with
minimal agency loss. After all, legislators and member states are not
required to delegate; they could govern, through statutory, administrative,
and judicial means, without creating new agents.
Contributors to this volume were asked to confront questions of
institutional design. Why, and on what terms, do relevant acts of delegation
occur? What systems of oversight are constructed to monitor the activities
of agents? Through what mechanisms can decisions taken by agents be
quashed?
Agency Discretion and Control
In the American literature the question of how best to define and
operationalise the gap that (inevitably) develops between what principals
want from agents and what agents actually do remains an open one.
Underlying the debate are differing views of the nature of discretion. In this
volume, we conceive of this gap in terms of a theoretical ‘zone of
discretion’. This zone is constituted by (a) the sum of delegated powers
(policy discretion) granted by the principal to the agent, minus (b) the sum
of control instruments, available for use by the principals to shape
(constrain) or annul (reverse) policy outcomes that emerge as a result of the
agent’s performance of set tasks. The zone of discretion can be defined
without reference to the policy preferences of the principal or the agent, as
we have just done. But for a number of reasons we expect such preferences
to be fundamental to the dynamics of the relationship between discretion
and control. 
First, if principals create an agent in order to realise certain policy
objectives, then the distribution of policy preferences among them, at the ex
ante moment of delegation, will help to determine how the zone of
discretion will be constructed. If principals wish to commit their successors
to the goal of low inflation, for example, they may decide to create a central
bank that is more or less insulated from interference by future elected
officials. If, faced with high levels of uncertainty in a given domain, they
hope to perfect the terms of regulatory policy – as problems emerge and
evolve – they may seek to construct effective ex post controls over their
agent. If they desire the smooth implementation of product standards, they
may require that the agent consult with those who are being regulated. Thus,
functional logics can generate relatively straightforward and testable
propositions. The more principals seek to pre-commit themselves to specific
policy outcomes, for example, the more powers they will delegate to an
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agent, and the weaker will be ex post mechanisms of control. In contrast, the
more principals seek a rich range of policy alternatives from which to select,
on an ongoing basis, the stronger will be the ex post mechanisms of control.
Our point is not that there is one functional logic of delegation, but diverse
ones, and that this diversity is partly generated by the preferences and
objectives of principals at the moment of constituting the agent.
Second, once an agent begins to exercise decision making powers, the
extent to which ex post instruments of control will actually be activated will
be partly related to the principal’s preferences over outcomes. The smaller
the zone of discretion, the greater the agent’s interest will be in monitoring
and anticipating the principal’s reactions to activities, to the extent of the
fear, or wish to avoid, having decisions overturned.
Third, in many situations, principals are not unified, which increases the
complexity of dealing with changes in preferences. Composite principals –
that is, a principal comprised of multiple actors whose collective makeup
changes periodically through, for example, elections – may not possess
stable, coherent preferences over time. Instead, they may be competitive
with one another over some or many issues, as when member state
governments in the EU disagree on matters of policy that fall within the
agents’ mandate. Even more complicated, the initial act of delegation may
parcel out – among multiple actors – the functions normally associated with
that of the principal. One organ may possess the power to quash a decision
taken by the agent, while another has staffing and funding authority. In such
cases, the linkages between the principals’ policy preferences, the agent’s
performance, and the principals’ capacity to control the agent may be
diluted. In the EU, for example, the Court of Justice, the Court of First
Instance, and the EU legislator (the Council of Ministers and the EP), have
powers to nullify the prospective effects of certain Commission acts taken
pursuant to secondary legislation, powers that depend on legal basis and
other circumstances. However, when the Commission enforces competition
rules, only the EU courts and those entities empowered to revise the treaty
may reverse its decisions. Is the Court of Justice a principal when it quashes
a Commission decision, or revises a Treaty provision through constitutional
interpretation in ways that bind the member states? No, since the founders
of the treaty designed the Court as an agent whose tasks include monitoring
the activities of other agents, and of the member states themselves. Control
over the Commission’s purse strings is mostly supranational, while control
over its recruitment is mostly intergovernmental; the EP can dismiss the
Commission on its own if it so decides. In situations of this complexity, the
analyst cannot assume that principals can control agents; instead, the
relationship between principals and agents must be carefully stipulated, in
light of the various means of control at the disposal of the former. 
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Finally, institutional arrangements – for example, the relative sizes of
‘zone of discretions’ – are continuous variables that organise principal–
agent relations. Majone has forcefully argued15 that when ‘political property
rights’16 have been transferred to agents, more or less completely and in
permanence, the standard P–A framework loses much of its relevance and
utility. Some members of this group agree (for example, Stone Sweet, this
volume). Majone proposes a model of fiduciary relations, in which
principals, faced with acute commitment problems, delegate broad, open-
ended authority to trustees to govern in their stead. In Majone’s terms:
‘Trustees are agents, but not all agents are trustees; a trustee is an agent and
something more’.17 A trustee typically wields the power to govern those
who have delegated in the first place. In the EU, for example, one of the
Court’s tasks is to interpret authoritatively provisions of the Treaty of
Rome; such rulings govern all legal persons in the Community, including
the member states. The Court, as constitutional court,18 is a trustee that is
well insulated from formal controls. However, when the Court interprets a
regulation or directive, it acts more as the agent of the EU legislator, and the
EU legislator monitors and corrects the Court’s rulings, through subsequent
legislative acts, as the legislator see fit.19 Similarly, as Majone points out,
when the Commission enforces competition rules it acts as a trustee (the
competence is stipulated by the Treaty); when it applies secondary
legislation to situations, it acts more as an agent. One proposition that can
be derived from such distinctions is that in a trustee situation, that is, where
the zone of discretion is all but unlimited, temporal changes in the
distribution of the principals’ preferences will have less impact on the
agent’s activities, or policy outcomes, than in an agency situation. The
problem of knowing how to identify the exact point, along any given
spectrum that arrays various forms of delegation, the agent is more properly
theorised as a trustee has not been resolved. 
Alternatives to Principal–Agent Logics
This project did not seek to achieve intra-group consensus on methods or
theory, but rather to initiate debates about both, in light of our respective
empirical interests. Indeed, one of this volume’s objectives is to assess
alternatives to P–A approaches to delegation. Let us clear away one false
issue immediately. We see no point in seeking to ‘disprove’ the P–A
construct, which is a vocabulary and a body of concepts, any more than one
could ‘disprove’ rational choice approaches to politics more generally.
There is a long tradition, both inside and outside the parameters set by the
framework, of criticising existing applications of the framework for having
been poorly specified.20 Faced with a challenge to received wisdom, the P–A
framework, like most rational choice-based theorising, is almost always
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flexible enough to absorb new variables and logics, albeit through
respecifying concepts in its own peculiar language.
That said, purely functional analysis is incapable of explaining some
important aspects of the emergence and evolution of institutional
arrangements. Stipulating the existence of sufficient functional demand to
support and sustain a new non-majoritarian institution tells us next to
nothing about how actors came to define problems in ways that pointed to
delegation. Functional problems can be addressed in myriad ways. How
actors perceive, and then select from, the choices available to them is almost
always conditioned by local histories, pre-existing institutional
arrangements, and contingent forces and events. Further, assuming that a
specific institution does provide some of the benefits of delegation tells us
nothing about how agents actually perform, and with what effect on the
world. Generally, functional analyses alone are ill-suited to deal with the
temporal dynamics of delegation.
The P–A framework may be dominated by other approaches on these
and other dimensions as well. So-called sociological institutionalists, for
example, have explored the question of why some forms spread as quickly
as they do, across social systems, at one time in history, rather than others.21
Historical accounts of ‘institutional isomorphism’ – how organisational
forms and models develop, standardise, and diffuse22 – are typically more
causally complete than are functional accounts. Although P–A approaches
focus heavily on institutional choice through design, organisational
sociologists have been more concerned with the broader processes that
advantage some institutional arrangements while disadvantaging others.
Further, unlike theories that are specified more generally, standard P–A
models operate at very low levels of abstraction, and do not in themselves
travel well. After all, a properly specified model purports to represent the
particularities of a specific case. Last, P–A approaches have been slow to
develop tools to capture the dynamics of the relationship between
principals, agents, and society, relationships typically constructed over time
by complex feedback loops that are difficult to model rigorously in game-
theoretic ways. So-called historical institutionalists claim to have developed
better tools, and they may be right. We return to these and related topics in
the next section.
Depending upon the research question, there may be comparative
advantages to using an existing alternative. For some purposes, a P–A
analysis might profitably complement a sociological or historical approach,
or one may help to explain residual variance left over by the other. But it
also may be that explanatory approaches developed by sociologists and
organisational theorists simply perform better, across the board, than do
P–A approaches. There are fierce difficulties associated with adjudicating
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between theories that may be a priori incommensurate. In this project, we
encouraged contributors to explore these issues as fully as possible, in terms
of more specific empirical concerns.
DELEGATING TO NON-MAJORITARIAN INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE
At first sight, the idea of elected politicians voluntarily passing powers to
unelected bodies such as courts, regulators, independent central banks and
the European Commission and Court of Justice runs counter to post-war
experiences of expansion in state activities and competencies in Western
Europe. Not surprisingly, our studies show that elected officials in Europe
have delegated in order to resolve various collective action problems.
National governments have transferred powers to EU institutions in order to
deal with the negative externalities of market integration, as well as to
monitor and enforce EU law (Tallberg, this volume). Constitutional courts
have provided a response to the dilemma of political parties who agreed on
the benefits of constitutional ‘rules of the game’, but disagreed, sometimes
fundamentally, on the precise content of those rules (Stone Sweet, this
volume). Independent regulatory authorities (Thatcher, this volume) and
competition authorities (Wilks and Bartle, this volume) have responded to
pressures to stabilise environments for investors, while enabling the state to
respond more effectively to increased technical complexity.23 The rhetoric
justifying independent central banks (McNamara, this volume) emphasises
the advantages of low inflation and price stability, thus reassuring key
business and financial interests. All of these bodies may offer elected
politicians scapegoats for hard choices for which they might otherwise be
blamed. 
While functional demands for delegation can almost always be
identified, most of the contributors to this volume argue that the pressures
on elected officials and the functions that NMIs can perform for them do
not, alone, explain the expansion of NMIs in Europe. Several lines of attack
are developed against purely functionalist models. First, those who delegate
are not just responding to functional demands; instead the perception that
delegation to NMIs is the best option for dealing with certain problems is
socially constructed, and that process is always analytically prior to the
decision to delegate. Katherine McNamara (this volume) denies that
independent central banks are a natural or necessary response to resolve a
commitment problem. She shows that independent central banks do not
always produce lower inflation and higher growth, that higher inflation does
not always harm economic growth, and that partisan-electoral factors do not
always lead to higher rates of inflation. Indeed, central bank independence
was introduced in Western Europe in the 1990s in an era of very low
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inflation. Instead, what is crucial is that elected officials around the globe
have come to see the independent central bank as an institution that fits
better with more general ideas about how the economy works than does a
bank controlled directly by a national treasury. In the field of competition
policy, Stephen Wilks and Ian Bartle (this volume) argue that the creation
of competition authorities in Britain was initially symbolic. Governments
wished to reassure business whilst believing that the authorities would be
unimportant (although in fact, those expectations were not fulfilled).
A second set of challenges for functionalist explanations arises from
variation, whether read across nation-states or policy domains. Most P–A
work on delegation has not attempted much cross-national comparison,
although Western Europe offers a fertile ground for developing and testing
theory.24 European polities, partly because they are similarly developed and
integrated into international and regional economies, face similar functional
pressures for delegation to NMIs. Yet outcomes vary. Although delegation
to NMIs has spread, countries have made quite different choices over when,
whether and how to delegate. Thus, Mark Thatcher (this volume) shows that
the practice of delegating to national independent regulatory agencies has
diffused steadily across various policy sectors, but that the structure and
operation of these agencies varies widely within any given domain, despite
the existence of similar pressures. There is also important variation across
sectors, within countries. Marian Döhler (this volume), for instance, finds
that Germany has delegated relatively little beyond long-standing,
successful NMIs, such as the Bundesbank, the Federal Cartel Office, and
the Constitutional Court. 
Third, functionalist explanations cannot account for the timing of
delegation. Germany established at least a semi-independent central bank
and a national competition authority in the 1950s, while other countries only
did so in the late 1980s and 1990s. The date of creation of constitutional
courts and independent regulatory agencies for the utilities also differs
across countries. Many of the governance problems emphasised by
proponents of P–A approaches pre-date delegation, credible commitment in
monetary policy or regulation, technical complexity or unpopular policies.
Yet they were rarely met by delegation to NMIs before the 1980s and 1990s.
Two sets of responses to these problems emerged within our group. One
was to adapt the P–A approach to the politics of NMIs in Europe by
carefully specifying local conditions. In the European context, which, in
contrast to the US situation, features strong political parties and
parliamentary government, the principals are mostly governments and
political parties. Although parliaments may pass legislation to delegate
powers to NMIs, they are largely controlled by the executive through strong
party systems and constitutional constraints. Contributors then investigate
10 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS
251wep01.qxd  18/12/2001  11:34  Page 10
how and why governments and parties delegate, in the context of new or
inherited political and constitutional structures. Several of the articles in this
volume (Stone Sweet, Tallberg, and Pollack, this volume) proceed in this
way. Others in the group felt that the P–A framework was too limiting, and
not sensitive enough to the contingencies of history, agency, ideas, and so
on (Döhler, Thatcher, Wilks and Bartle). They wanted richer accounts of
why, when, and how delegation occurs, and they explore factors that P–A
analyses conceptualise differently, mention only in passing, or ignore
altogether. We discuss three of these factors here: the definition of interests,
institutional isomorphism, and historical legacies. These are applied to the
two key elements of institutional design: the decision to delegate; and the
institutional form selected.
The Decision to Delegate to an NMI 
Since delegation is not costless, principals must believe that their interests
are better served by delegating to an NMI, relative to an existing situation or
an alternative institutional arrangement. Their decisions are influenced by
national and international examples of delegation, by pressures from those to
be regulated or otherwise concerned, and by existing institutional
constraints. Hence we need to investigate the interests of decision makers,
policy learning and institutional isomorphism, and institutional inheritances.
Interests. Offering a fuller explanation of the spread of delegation of NMIs
(including variations in extent and timing), whether within a P–A
framework or outside it, must begin by specifying the interests of the key
actors involved in the decision to delegate. The question of how, across
Europe, delegation to NMIs came to be considered an appropriate response
to an increasing number of governance problems is an empirical one; it must
be investigated rather than assumed or traced backwards from the existence
or lack of delegation. Some members of the group addressed this question
through methods commonly associated with ‘historical’ and ‘sociological’
institutionalism,25 showing how preferences for new NMIs were constructed
or altered (for example, McNamara, Thatcher, Wilks/Bartle, this volume).
They show several routes whereby the interests of elected officials altered.
Pressures were exerted on governments by powerful interests such as
bankers and business, who sought delegation for their own ends, such as a
more predictable, less ‘politicised’ environment. Assumptions of how
agreed policy aims could be achieved evolved – for example, politicians
came to believe that their interests in low inflation were better served by an
independent central banks. In fields such as general competition policy or
sectoral regulation, elected officials, confronted by scandals, technical
complexity and international pressures, together with new ideas and
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examples for reform, concluded that having direct control over policy, or at
least appearing to have it, was no longer advantageous. 
Other contributors adopted standard assumptions of rational choice (for
example, Shapiro, Stone Sweet, Tallberg, this volume), but then focused
attention on how the activities of agents within domains constituted by
delegation ‘feeds back’ onto the wider political system. Thus judges, be
they in constitutional courts or engaged in judicial review, have developed
legal doctrines that extend their powers and constrain those of elected
politicians. In the EU, the ECJ exploited differences among national
governments to enhance the effectiveness of EU law, and thus to increase its
owns powers in the polity. 
Policy Learning and Institutional Isomorphism. Policy learning and
institutional isomorphism (transfer of institutional forms) have been crucial
to the spread of NMIs in Europe.26 At times, the American experience with
delegation has generated templates for reform and norms of appropriateness
that have travelled across the Atlantic, particularly to Britain.27 In other
situations, European polities have copied one another. General competition
authorities spread via an ‘orgy of borrowing’ (Wilks and Bartle, this
volume); the creation of an independent regulator in telecommunications in
Britain was followed by similar bodies in other European countries
(Thatcher, this volume); the Austrian constitutional court ultimately
mutated into a pan-European institution, through successive waves of
democratisation in this century (Stone Sweet, this volume); independent
central banks (McNamara, this volume) became de rigueur in the 1990s.28
Cross-domain isomorphism has probably been less important, although it
has taken place across closely related fields, such as utilities regulation.29
Much of the day-to-day politics in domains governed by NMIs is heavily
structured by the activities of knowledge-based elites. These include
scientists, other technical experts, economists, bankers, and lawyers. Such
actors have developed strong corporate or professional interests in the work
of NMIs. They help to diffuse NMIs and the models of governance that go
with them facilitate institutional isomorphism, not least by working to
legitimise some forms of governance while delegitimising others.30 In
increasingly Europeanised and internationalised domains such as central
banking, utilities regulation or competition policy, transnational
communities of professionals have contributed to making delegation to
NMIs part of ‘good governance’ norms that have become orthodoxy.31 The
process has not been disinterested: these actors increase their own social
power and influence.
‘Coercive isomorphism’32 – the diffusion of institutional forms and
practices through legal obligation backed up by monitoring and
12 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS
251wep01.qxd  18/12/2001  11:34  Page 12
enforcement mechanisms – has also played a role in the spread of delegation
to NMIs. European integration has favored isomorphic processes.33 The
Maastricht Treaty, for example, insisted on independent central banks as a
precondition for entry into a single currency. Many important pieces of EC
secondary legislation provide pressure for delegation to specialised
agencies. New constitutions, the European Convention of Human Rights,
and the development of EU law require judges to engage in more judicial
review of agencies (Shapiro, this volume).
Institutional Legacies. The pace and scope of delegation to NMIs have been
strongly mediated by national-level factors.34 State structures influence the
possibility, attractiveness, and ease of delegation to NMIs. In countries such
as Britain, with relatively few constraints on the executive and no
entrenched constitution, delegation to NMIs can be achieved relatively
quickly. Thus the Bank of England was made independent in 1997, almost
literally overnight, despite no such pledge having been made in Labour’s
election manifesto. When constitutions have broken down and are
completely rewritten, powerful opportunities exist for delegation – for
instance, by creating new constitutional courts or agencies. However, if the
creation of a new NMI requires constitutional amendment, with super-
majorities or special procedures, reforms will be more difficult to introduce.
Delegation in Germany faces an uphill battle to the extent that it meets with
various legal obstacles, such as the constitutionally protected prerogatives
of the Länder (see Döhler, this volume). 
State structures and institutional legacies affect the relative costs and
benefits of different organisational forms.35 In Britain, regulatory
commissions date back to the nineteenth century. Moreover, governments
find it relatively easy to alter the organisational basis and personnel of NMIs
such as regulatory agencies which do not enjoy specific constitutional
protection. In countries like Italy, such agencies have formal independence
and nomination procedures can be complex due to the involvement of the
legislature. In Germany, an alternative and apparently successful regulatory
model of federal agencies within ministries, a powerful Cartel Office and
strong regional traditions, have acted as a barrier to the creation of sectoral
independent regulatory agencies.36 Inheritance also affects learning and the
search for organisational forms. Thus, long-standing linkages by British
policy makers to the United States aided the importation of American
examples of delegation; one example is the way in which utility
commissions such as the FCC in telecommunications, inspired semi-
independent regulators in Britain.37 In contrast, continental states have
looked more to each other for institutional developments.
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Institutional Forms of Delegation to NMIs
Delegation to non-majoritarian institutions has taken many forms in Europe,
both cross-nationally and across domains. Comparison of ‘zones of
discretion’, requiring examination of the powers delegated and the controls
imposed on NMIs, offers insights into the variety of institutional forms. 
Constitutional courts and independent central banks operate in the most
extensive zones of discretion, although there is significant variation across
countries. Their decisions are difficult to reverse, often requiring
constitutional amendment, they face relatively few ongoing controls and
their organisational position is frequently highly protected by being
embedded in constitutions. The European Commission operates in a more
restrictive environment when it deals with representatives of the member-
states in the Council of Ministers or the European Council, than it does
when it enforces the competition rules found in the Rome Treaty. In
Majone’s terms, in the former context it looks and behaves like an agent vis-
à-vis principals, while in the latter it resembles, as does the constitutional
judge, a trustee exercising fiduciary powers (Stone Sweet, Tallberg, this
volume). 
The sum of powers delegated to national regulatory authorities looks
modest when compared to the courts and central banks. Regulators’ powers
are circumscribed – for instance, to policing specified anti-competitive
behaviour, approving certain types of merger, imposing fines and enforcing
licences. Their decisions can be reversed relatively easily – by ordinary
legislation, judicial ruling, or sometimes simply by ministerial order. They
require considerable resources to function effectively, but these are
allocated by annual budgetary procedures under the control of their
principals, namely governments and legislatures. Legally, elected officials
can easily abolish or alter the organisational structure of regulatory
authorities since these are rarely protected by constitutional provisions. The
volume, nonetheless, shows that the authority of these agents has increased
over time. Finally, delegation has been weakest towards executive agencies
of governments (see Döhler, this volume). Indeed, most were excluded from
this volume because they did not meet the minimum requirements to
constitute a NMI, particularly that of not being directly managed by elected
officials and enjoying powers separate from other institutions, notably
ministers and civil servants. 
One explanation of differing forms across domains is to link institutional
design to pressures on principals and the functions performed by NMIs
offers. Where delegation takes place in order to secure credible
commitment, principals cannot impose many ex post controls over the agent
without undermining the very purpose of delegation. The more acute the
commitment problem that principals face (or believe they face), the more
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discretion they will delegate – for example, in enforcing EU law or in
monetary policy. Where officials delegate to increase technical efficiency,
reduce their workload, or improve their information, extensive ex post
controls are often more compatible with objectives. Thus, when principals
seek to take advantage of the technical expertise of NMIs in regulatory
environments characterised by great uncertainty, they will create agents
(and not trustees) whose purpose is to lower the costs of making good
policy. 
Such general functionalist explanations of institutional form are useful
but equally are subject to the same criticisms as those applied to analyses of
the decision to delegate. They offer only limited predictions about specific
choices made in countries or domains that are strongly influenced by history
and context. Choices over institutional form are often greatly constrained by
cognitive and normative limits, existing state structures, and institutional
legacies. Hence contributors enriched their explanations by looking at such
factors either within a P–A framework or outside it. 
State and domain traditions provide templates of institutional forms.
Often elected officials copy existing forms, leading to ‘institutional
isomorphism’. In Germany, the same ‘genetic code’ has led to an almost
automatic copying of the same institutional form for federal agencies
(Döhler, this volume). Institutional forms have been ‘read across’ domains
within countries for regulatory agencies, leading to a ‘British utility
regulatory’ model, or French ‘Autorités Administratives Indépendentes’
(Thatcher, this volume). The spread of the Kelsenian constitutional court,
now in place from Portugal to Russia, proceeded first from the rejection of
American-style judicial review, given embedded separation of powers
doctrines, and then through rote copying (Stone Sweet, this volume). 
Constitutional and state arrangements strongly structure decisions on
institutional form. In countries with legislatures that enjoy greater
independence from the executive, nomination to, and controls over, agents
tend to be shared between the two bodies (for example, Germany, Italy).
Where executive powers are more highly centralised (Britain, France), such
controls are typically wielded by cabinets and ministries.38 The extent of
judicial review of agencies and its biases towards support for agencies or for
challengers to them, are influenced by factors such as national legal
doctrines, legal fashions, and the training, recruitment and career patterns of
judges (Shapiro, this volume). 
POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND CONSEQUENCES 
The consequences of delegation to NMIs are as important as decisions over
initial institutional design for our case studies. NMIs have become powerful
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participants in policy making and may now constitute a ‘fourth branch of
government’ in Europe. Delegation to them has affected the distribution of
power, with winners and losers. It has also had impacts on processes of
decision making, substantive policy making and further institutional reform.
For analytic purposes, we can divide the effects of delegation to NMIs into
two groups: the immediate and direct effects of NMI behaviour; feedback
effects whereby NMI decisions affect the wider environment of NMIs
leading to further rounds of consequences. In addition, delegation to NMIs
has raised wider concerns of legitimacy and accountability.
The case studies suggest that the greater the initial ‘zone of discretion’,
the more significant are the effects (direct and indirect) of delegation and
the more likely are unanticipated consequences. NMIs such as
constitutional courts, which have great powers and face few controls (that
is, are better understood as trustees than agents), routinely generate
sweeping outcomes that are frequently unanticipated. Nevertheless,
understanding the consequences of delegation requires tracing the effects of
NMI behaviour in their context and inclusion of the reactions of other
actors: the formal initial zone of discretion is the starting point for analysis,
not the end of it.
Direct Effects
Within the state, delegation has seen the emergence of powerful NMIs.
Analysts using P–A approaches typically focus on the extent to which agents
may escape from the latter’s control, due to information asymmetries, divided
or multiple principals, and so on. They then discuss how the design of formal
controls can limit such ‘agency losses’.39 Yet determining ‘agency losses’ and
‘control’ poses fierce methodological difficulties, especially of observed
equivalence, as Mark Pollack points out. We have therefore examined the
relationship between elected officials and NMIs in relation to the initial ‘zone
of discretion’ established by formal powers and controls. As a result, case
studies are sensitive to how the position of NMIs vis-à-vis their principals
may change over time, and in ways unanticipated at the moment of
delegation. The British government believed that general competition
authorities would be largely symbolic, to placate business interests; in
practice, they became bodies exerting considerable powers (Wilks and Bartle,
this volume). The ECJ has unexpectedly expanded its authority (and that of
national judges) through its rulings (Tallberg, this volume). At times, the
power of NMIs has differed sharply from formal institutional arrangements.
The German Federal Cartel Office became a great deal more independent of
elected politicians than warranted by its initial formal position. Establishing
constitutional courts in Europe ultimately led to an important expansion in
judicial, relative to legislative, power (Stone Sweet).
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Delegation has also influenced the power of private interests. It has
offered new opportunities to challenge public decisions compared with
previous state structures. Constitutional courts and courts reviewing
administrative agencies through judicial review have allowed those who
lose through the party political and central government process another
opportunity to challenge decisions. Independent regulatory authorities have
been more open to new entrants than governments, who engaged in closed
relationships with national champion firms.40
NMIs have marked substantive policy decisions. General competition
authorities and regulatory agencies have vigourously promoted liberalisation
and the reduction of cross-subsidies. The European Commission and ECJ
have aided increased European integration, economic liberalisation and the
rights of individuals (including firms) against states. Courts have sometimes
checked government secrecy, protected individual liberties and pushed
forward policies across many fields. Independent central banks have
promoted monetarist policies that give inflation a higher immediate priority
than combating unemployment and seek to limit public expenditure. These
are but a few examples of the effects of NMIs drawn from our case studies,
for there is barely a policy domain unaffected by NMI action. 
In analysing the direct impacts of NMIs, the formal powers of NMIs and
controls for elected politicians offer a good starting point. The case studies
also suggest that the wider political context affects the use of controls  for
example, the party structure and number of veto players and points. In
countries such as Britain with few veto points and players, single party
governments with majorities can more easily apply controls than in other
countries (see, for example, Shapiro, this volume). 
However, formal structures offer only limited explanation for the
consequences of delegation. NMIs are not passive  rather, they can be
active, creative actors. They have learned how to exploit their powers in
unexpected ways – the legal doctrines created by the ECJ and constitutional
courts offer excellent cases (Shapiro, Stone Sweet and Tallberg, this
volume). Informal norms grow up that may alter or subvert formal
arrangements – for example, independence for the German Cartel Office.
NMIs have sought to go beyond their formal roles and developed norms that
may differ from their formal objectives and position (for instance, the
German Federal Cartel Office and Bundesbank making independence from
elected politicians a central norm or sectoral regulators setting themselves
the promotion of fair and effective competition as their central objective  –
see Wilks/Bartle, Döhler and Thatcher contributions, this volume). 
Feedback Effects
The behaviour of NMIs modify the decision making, investments, and
strategic interactions of other actors, which may feed back on principals and
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the NMIs themselves. The activities of courts or regulatory agencies have
led interest groups to reorient their activities to them, in order to increase
their own influence; in turn, the behaviour of those interest groups has
provided new opportunities for NMIs to expand their influence. Earlier
choices to delegate have also influenced later choices, for delegation is
often a process rather than a one-off event and, moreover, one in which
NMIs can be active agents. In the EU, the Commission and ECJ have been
major players in treaty making processes, some of which have broadened
their powers. At the same time, national governments have learned from
previous experience: they excluded some new domains from the first
‘pillar’ of decision making; in other domains, where inter-governmental co-
operation failed (for example, immigration or security), they delegated new
powers to EU institutions (Jonas Tallberg, this volume). Similarly, the
apparent success of regulatory agencies has led to a widening of their
powers in countries such as Britain and France. 
Explaining feedback effects requires attention to how the environment,
especially the zone of discretion, structures the interactions between NMIs,
their principals, and other actors. The ECJ’s interpretations of the Treaty of
Rome have produced powerful feedback effects, some of which have
affected later Treaty amendments, partly because reversal requires
unanimity among member states (Tallberg contribution, this volume).41
Another aspect is the presence of informal norms. The initial limited formal
autonomy of the German Federal Cartel Office was expanded by strong
informal norms; in turn, these hindered the creation of other regulatory
bodies (Wilks/Bartle, Döhler, Thatcher, this volume). Feedback effects such
as these were unanticipated by principals at the time of the initial
delegation.
Legitimacy and Accountability
Delegation to NMIs poses difficulties for the traditional model of
parliamentary accountability in Western Europe. Moreover, the legitimacy
of NMIs affects their power and acceptance.
‘Output legitimacy’ is the current standard justification for NMIs.42 The
superior performance of NMIs, relative to the result that would be likely if
elected politicians were to perform the functions themselves, justifies their
existence. Benefits include more ‘efficient’ policy making procedures and
better policy outcomes, enhanced rights protection, lower inflation, and so
on. In this view, delegation is portrayed as neutral and beneficial. Indeed,
the legitimacy of NMIs is only at issue when agents are corrupted, or fail to
deliver adequate levels of promised benefits.43
Yet the output model of legitimacy, because it ignores too much of
political importance, does not offer a comprehensive response to many
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important legitimacy concerns. The model typically assumes ideological
consensus on the role, function, and benefits to be accrued from delegation,
whereas these points are contested by parties and groups. There are winners
and losers from delegation to NMIs which form part of political struggles.
The liberalisation of markets, part of the logic of creating independent
regulatory authorities, have been the subject of vigorous partisan wrangling,
precisely because some industries and interests will lose from liberalisation
and the re-regulation that comes with it. There is intense controversy about
how and whether to widen and deepen European political integration.
Central banks may pursue low inflation, but their decisions may induce
higher levels of unemployment. 
A second model of legitimacy is procedural. It relies on the process of
decision making by NMIs being better than the insular, often secret,
deliberations of cabinets and executives. NMIs typically pursue clearer,
more focused mandates than elected politicians, all the more so since
delegation usually involves explicitly setting objectives for them. They are
often obliged to give reasons for their decisions and to publish information.
They are frequently more open than central governments to interested
groups – for example, the European Commission is much more accessible
compared to national bureaucracies,44 whilst in the utilities independent
sectoral regulators have ended closed relationships of ministries and
suppliers by creating elaborate consultation procedures. Legislatures have
powers over NMIs, including rights over nominations, information and
calling hearings, and have used them to publish valuable information and to
put pressure on NMIs.
According to this view, procedural legitimacy is a fair and democratic
substitute for electoral accountability, given the broader purposes of
delegation. As NMIs have spread in Europe, these two models of legitimacy
are increasingly combined: output legitimacy is bolstered by procedural
legitimacy.
CONCLUSIONS
Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions has reconfigured the
architecture of the state and the EU, altered public policies, and raised issues
of legitimacy and accountability. This volume explores some of the crucial
questions at the very core of these politics. Who has delegated and why?
What institutions have been established, for what purposes, and how great
are their respective zones of discretion? How have NMIs actually governed
and with what effects? 
Although functional rationales can help us to answer some of these
questions, purely functionalist analysis suffers from a number of major
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limitations, since it plays down the historically contingent, contested, and
political sources and logics of delegation.45 Moreover, approaches that
explain institutional design, without going further, miss much that is vital in
the consequences of delegation. These limitations are well exposed by
analysis of delegation in Western Europe, especially by cross-national
comparison over time and across domains.
In response, this volume’s contributors either supplement or replace
purely functional accounts of delegation with more fine-grained or
historically sensitive analyses of institutional choice. They investigate
decisions to delegate in their contexts – country, time, and domain. They
acknowledge constraints on the choices of principals – cognitive,
normative, political, and constitutional – thus incorporating concern for
policy learning and the spread of ideas, as well as the weight of inherited
structures, norms, and experience. The volume shows that a broad range of
outcomes are impossible to predict from the initial conditions of delegation,
but are instead produced by the dynamics of interactions between NMIs and
other multiple actors. The politics of delegation in Europe today calls for
analyses going well beyond simple functional logics, involving how actors’
interests are defined, policy is made and enforced, and the legitimacy of
government is conceived.
NOTES
1. We have chosen to use the term institution as a synonym for a political body, organ, or
organisation. In the standard vocabulary of social science institutionalism, institutions refer
to the constitutive elements of the rule systems found in any human community. We use the
terms, ‘rules’, ‘law’, and ‘legal instruments’ to refer to institutions in this second sense.
2. Good recent reviews of this literature include J. Huber and C. Shipan, ‘The Costs of Control:
Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25 (2000),
pp.25–42; J. Bendor, A. Glazer and T. Hammond, ‘Theories of Delegation’, Annual Review
of Political Science 4 (2001), pp.235–69. 
3. E.g., W. Powell and P. DiMaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1991).
4. E.g., G. Majone, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’, West European Politics 17/3
(1994), pp.77–101; G. Majone, Regulating Europe (London: Routledge 1996).
5. E.g., M. Pollack, ‘Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community’,
International Organization 51/1 (1997), pp.99–134; M. Pollack, ‘The Engines of
Integration? Supranational Autonomy and Influence in the European Union’, in W.
Sandholtz and A. Stone Sweet (eds.), European Integration and Supranational Governance
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998), pp.217–49.
6. In addition to the work of Pollack and Majone cited above, see J. Tallberg, ‘Making States
Comply: The European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the Enforcement of
the Internal Market’ (Ph.D. diss., Lund University 1999); J. Tallberg, ‘The Anatomy of
Autonomy: An Institutional Account of Variation in Supranational Influence’, Journal of
Common Market Studies 38/5 (2000), pp.843–64, A. Stone Sweet and J. Caporaso, ‘From
Free Trade to Supranational Polity: The European Court and Integration’, in Sandholtz and
Stone Sweet (eds.), European Integration and Supranational Governance.
7. See T. Bergman, W. Müller and K. Strøm (eds.), Parliamentary Democracy and the Chain
of Delegation, special issue of European Journal of Political Research 37 (2000). 
20 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS
251wep01.qxd  18/12/2001  11:34  Page 20
8. A. Stone Sweet, ‘Judicialization and the Construction of Governance’, Comparative
Political Studies 31 (1999), p.147.
9. T. Moe, ‘The New Economics of Organization’, American Journal of Political Science 28
(1985), pp.739–77; D. Epstein and S. O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost
Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separation of Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press 1999), ch.3.
10. Huber and Shipan, ‘The Costs of Control’, p.41.
11. E.g., S. Balla, ‘Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy’,
American Political Science Review 92/3 (1998), pp.663–73.
12. Alternative ways of thinking about delegation do not necessarily embody alternative, or
rival, explanations. For explanations to compete, they must be specified in a sufficiently clear
causal form to be compared with one another, in light of empirical research and findings. It
is possible that virtually identical hypotheses, or causal propositions, could be generated
from quite different theoretical vocabularies and materials.
13. Epstein and O’Halloran, Delegating Powers, pp.24–5.
14. K. Bawn, ‘Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight,
and the Committee System’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 13 (1997),
pp.101–26.
15. G. Majone, ‘Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance’,
European Union Politics 2/1 (2001), pp.103–22.
16. T. Moe, ‘Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story’, Journal of Law, Economics,
and Organisation 6 (1990), pp.213–53.
17. Majone, ‘Two Logics of Delegation’, p.113.
18. A. Stone Sweet, Governing with Judge: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2000).
19. Stone Sweet and Caporaso, ‘From Free Trade to Supranational Polity’.
20. E.g., Balla, ‘Administrative Procedures’; T. Moe, ‘An Assessment of the Positive Theory of
“Congressional Dominance”’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 12 (1987), pp.475–520.
21. J.W. Meyer and R.L. Jepperson, ‘The “Actors” of Modern Society: The Cultural
Construction of Social Agency’, Sociological Theory 18 (2000), pp.100–120; R.L.
Jepperson, ‘The Development and Application of Sociological Neoinstitutionalism’, Robert
Schuman Centre Working Paper 2001/5.
22. P. DiMaggio and W. Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality’, in W. Powell and P. DiMaggio (eds.), The New Institutionalism in
Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1991).
23. See also B. Levy and P. Spiller (eds.), Regulation, Institutions and Commitment (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1996).
24. In the field of European politics, exceptions include: Bergman et al., Parliamentary
Democracy and the Chain of Delegation; J. Huber and A. Lupia, ‘Cabinet Instability and
Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science 45/1
(2001), pp.18–33; Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges.
25. Cf. P. Hall and R. Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Political
Studies 44/4 (1996), pp.936–57; K. Thelen, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative
Politics’, The Annual Review of Political Science 1999 (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews 1999);
E. Immergut, ‘The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism’, Politics and Society 25/1
(1998), pp.5–34.
26. For institutional isomorphism, see DiMaggio and Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited’; for
policy transfer and learning, see reviews, notably D. Dolowitz and D. Marsh (1996), ‘Who
Learns What From Whom? A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature’, Political Studies
44/2, pp.343–57; P.A. Hall, ‘Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State’, Comparative
Politics 25/3 (1993), pp.275–96; J.L. Campbell, ‘Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas
in Political Economy’, Theory and Society 27/4 (1998), pp.377–409; R. Rose, Lesson-
drawing in Public Policy (London: Chatham House Publishers 1993).
27. Cf. H. Wolman, ‘Understanding Cross-National Policy Transfers: The Case of Britain and
the US’, Governance 5/1 (1992), pp.27–45; for the example of telecommunications, see M.
Thatcher, The Politics of Telecommunications (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999).
21DELEGATION TO NON-MAJORITARIAN INSTITUTIONS
251wep01.qxd  18/12/2001  11:34  Page 21
28. See also B. Doern and S. Wilks (eds.), Comparative Competition Policy: National
Institutions in a Global Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996); K. McNamera, The
Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press 1998).
29. D. Coen and M. Thatcher (eds.), Regulating European Utilities, special issue of Current
Politics and Economics of Europe 9/4 (2000).
30. Through a process that DiMaggio and Powell call ‘normative isomorphism’.
31. Cf. S. Jacobs, Regulatory Governance: Improving the Basis for Sectoral Regulation (Paris:
OECD 2000); J.L. Guesch and P. Spiller, Managing the Regulatory Process: Design,
Concepts, Issues and the Latin American and Carribbean Story (World Bank: Washington
1999); B. Levy and P. Spiller, Regulation, Institutions and Commitment (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1996).
32. DiMaggio and Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited’.
33. C. Radaelli, ‘Policy Transfer in the European Union’, Governance 13/1 (2000), pp.25–43.
34. S. Berger and R. Dore (eds.), National Diversity and Global Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press 1996); V. Schmidt, ‘Still Three Models of Capitalism? The Dynamics of
Economic Adjustment in Britain, Germany and France’, in R. Czada and S. Lütz (eds.), Die
Politische Konstitution von Märkten (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 2000); S.K. Vogel,
Freer Markets, More Rules. Regulatory Reform in Advanced Industrial Countries (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press 1996).
35. For a rational choice view of the effects of political context on delegation, see J. Huber, C.
Shipan and M. Pfahler, ‘Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy’, American
Journal of Political Science 45/2 (2001), pp.330–45; J. Huber and C. Shipan, ‘Legislators
and Agencies: A Theoretical Reappraisal’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 25 (2000),
pp.25–52.
36. Cf. A. Héritier, C. Knill and S. Mingers, Ringing the Changes (Berlin: De Gruyter 1996); for
electricity where no sectoral regulator was created in contrast to other EU countries, see B.
Eberlein, ‘Institutional Change and Continuity in German Infrastructure Management: The
Case of Electricity Reform’, German Politics 9/3 (2000), pp.81–104.
37. Cf. Wolman, ‘Understanding Cross National Policy Transfers’; Thatcher, The Politics of
Telecommunications.
38. See Huber et al., ‘Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy’; and Huber and
Shipan, ‘Legislators and Agencies’.
39. Such losses arise from agency ‘slippage’ (agents following their own preferences which
diverge from those of its principal(s)) and ‘shirking’ (institutional incentives causing the
agent to behave contrary to the wishes of its principal(s)). See M. McCubbins and T.
Schwartz, ‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms’,
American Journal of Political Science 28/1 (1984), pp.165–79; McCubbins et al.,
‘Administrative Procedures’; T. Moe, ‘An Assessment of the Positive Theory of
Congressional Dominance’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 12/4 (1987), pp.475–520.
40. Thatcher, The Politics of Telecommunications; J. Hayward (ed.), Industrial Enterprise and
European Integration. From National to Internationalized Champions: Firms and
Governments in the West European Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995).
41. Explored at length in Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges, ch. 6.
42. Cf. Levy and Spiller, Regulation, Institutions and Commitment; Majone, Regulating Europe.
43. G. Majone, ‘The Crisis of Community Credibility’, Journal of Common Market Studies 38/2
(2000), pp.273–302.
44. S. Mazey and J. Richardson (eds.), Lobbying in the European Community (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 1993).
45. Cf. Moe, ‘Political Institutions’.
22 WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS
251wep01.qxd  18/12/2001  11:34  Page 22
